Evidence I present in this paper from two rural surveys-one conducted in 2002 and the other in 2010-reflects a dramatic and positive turnaround in state-society relations in the Chinese countryside. Information villagers reported in the surveys reflect improvements in public goods provision, household economic conditions, and popular perceptions of the government in the wake of a pro-rural policy shift beginning in 2004 and heightened by China's 2008 economic stimulus plan. The surveys also suggest that public goods are an important reason why statesociety relations have improved. Public goods significantly enhanced villagers' perception that the government cares about their wellbeing. Although every level of government enjoyed a popularity boost from improvements in public goods provision, the greatest gains were made at local levels of the state. At the same time, however, we have reason to question the long-term sustainability of this positive trajectory. Lying beneath these positive trends are ominous signs of potential threats to state-society relations on the horizon. Heralded as reversing decades if not centuries of urban areas feeding off of rural areas (both literally and figuratively), this historically momentous pro-rural policy shift received a further boost from China's 2008 economic stimulus plan, which opened a new spigot for investment in public goods, including infrastructure and social welfare.
Heralded as reversing decades if not centuries of urban areas feeding off of rural areas (both literally and figuratively), this historically momentous pro-rural policy shift received a further boost from China's 2008 economic stimulus plan, which opened a new spigot for investment in public goods, including infrastructure and social welfare.
In this chapter I refer to the various pro-rural policies that characterize this watershed moment as China's "rural economic stimulus policies" (or "rural stimulus" for short) because they were designed, above all, to raise rural incomes, reduce rural-urban income inequality, and boost domestic consumer demand. Chinese scholars and government leaders alike have consistently identified China's widening income gap as a grave-if not the gravest-source of discontent and unrest, and thus of danger to social and political stability. 3 Has the rural stimulus had its intended effect of thawing state-society tensions? Survey data collected before and after the implementation of the rural stimulus are the basis of my assessment of its impact on statesociety relations. Quasi-experimental conditions such as these afford a unique opportunity to assess the effects of the new policies on the lives of hundreds of millions of China's villagers.
This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section of this chapter I will set the stage for my empirical analysis by contextualizing the relationship between public goods and state-society relations. To generalize sweepingly, in the time between the implementation of fiscal reforms in the mid-1990s and the full implementation of China's rural economic stimulus policies fifteen years later, public goods provision in rural China strained more than promoted state-society relations. A step forward in rural state-society relations seems to have been achieved by the pro-rural policies introduced in 2006, buttressed and further expanded by the 2008 economic stimulus. They not only greatly enhanced public goods provision in rural areas, but they did so for the first time in over a decade without compelling local levels of government to extract revenue directly from villagers. In the second section I introduce the surveys and provide detailed information about the measures I employ in my analyses.
The third section contains the results of my analyses. Three main findings I present reflect a turning point in rural state-society relations. First, popular assessments of local government performance improved between 2002 and 2010. Second, perceptions of investment in public goods are a significant predictor of popular assessments of the state. Third, although the public image of every level of the state benefitted from enhanced public goods investment, local levels of government enjoyed a far greater public image boost than the central government.
In the fourth and final section of this chapter, my concluding comments, I consider the sustainability of this positive trajectory. Lying beneath the positive general trend I report in this chapter are ominous signs of potential threats to state-society relations on the horizon.
Background
A brief, schematic overview of public goods provision in rural China over the past two decades brings into high relief its influence on the quality of state-society relations. The story of the shift from central economic planning to markets in post-1978 China is the story of dismantling socialist institutions and shifting the burden of healthcare, education, social welfare, infrastructural development and maintenance, and other services to local levels of governments, market actors, families, and individuals. Many basic obligations of the Chinese socialist state to its citizens, including public goods provision, were rapidly decentralized, privatized, and marketized throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 4 As a direct consequence, public goods provision eroded dramatically in rural China during this time period. Healthcare is a poignant example. The "commodification of health care services" in this period of time was accompanied by a precipitous drop in healthcare coverage. In the thirty years between 1975 and 2005, the proportion of rural residents with access to free community-based healthcare dropped from 85 to 10 per cent.
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According to another estimate, rural healthcare insurance coverage declined from 80 to 7 per cent between 1980 and 1998. 6 In roughly the same time period, the number of rural healthcare workers declined from 3.5 million to half a million. Healthcare provision is a microcosm of the larger landscape of public goods provision in rural China. The general portrait of public goods provision as a whole-including public 4 infrastructure, social welfare, and education-in post-1978 rural China is of backsliding to bareminimum levels.
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As higher levels of government retreated from public goods provision, local governments and non-state entities, including village clan organizations, picked up some but not all of the slack in the countryside. 11 Adding insult to injury, until recently this limited and diminished level of public goods provision was funded in no small measure through unlawfully heavy and sometimes ruthlessly extracted taxes, fees, and levies imposed by the local state on ordinary villagers. 12 Not surprisingly, this period of time was characterized by tense and sometimes openly antagonistic state-society relations in rural China. 13 In recent years, however, thanks to new policies introduced by the Hu-We administration, this volatile and contentious state of affairs seems to have reversed course.
1993-2003: TENSIONS INTENSIFY IN RURAL CHINA
In global perspective, China's public financing system is an extreme example of decentralization: education, health, social welfare, and other public goods have been and remain financed and provided overwhelmingly by local levels of government. 14 In rural China, the bulk of the burden to finance and provide public goods has fallen on township and county governments, although village governments too "have significant expenditure responsibilities even though they have no independent fiscal powers." 15 Fiscal reforms implemented in 1993-94, by increasing the upwards flow of tax revenue from local levels of governments to the central government, further compromised rural public goods provision. In order to fund minimal levels of public goods provision while meeting their fiscal obligations to the central government, local governments resorted to heavier taxation in the form of unauthorized fees and levies. 16 In parts of rural China without much in the way of industry and commerce, local governments could only extract revenue directly from villagers. 17 The construction and maintenance of public goods depended on corvée labor, as well as cash fines paid in lieu of such mandatory labor services. 18 The upshot of local governments' imperative to tax was the well-documented "peasants' burdens" (nongmin fudan, 农民负担) phenomenon, which in turn generated widespread popular resistance and the alarming deterioration of state-society relations. Shortly afterwards, the new Hu-Wen administration, owing to the importance it attached to addressing rural state-society conflict, elevated tax reform to a new level. In March 2004 Premier Wen Jiabao promised to abolish rural taxes altogether nationwide within five years. In the same month, the northeastern provinces of Heilongjiang and Jilin announced that, effective immediately, rural taxes would be abolished, and eleven other provinces announced tax reductions. 21 The following year Premier Wen announced an acceleration of the tax-relief timetable: the abolishment of all rural taxes nationwide within one year. 22 Tax reform, however, does not appear to have translated directly into improved statesociety relations. On the contrary, according to some accounts, tax reform had the paradoxical effect of weakening public goods provision by further reducing sources of local government revenue. In the absence of alternative sources of public financing such as fiscal transfers from higher levels of government, tax reform, by limiting the revenue-extraction powers of local government, and thus by creating critical budget shortfalls, had the short-term consequence of further compromising public goods provision. 23 Even if tax reform negatively impacted public goods provision in the short run, evidence suggests longer-run trends were, on balance, positive. According to a survey of almost 2,500 villages across China, the quantity of village-level public goods projects increased dramatically between 1998 and 2004. At the same time, however, despite an increase in the share of public financing coming from higher levels of government in this time period, village governments in 2004 remained a far more important source of financing than higher levels of government for public goods projects. For this reason, the vulnerability of public goods projects immediately following the implementation of tax reform is not hard to understand.
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Research and media reports also suggest that, in the wake of tax reform, "land grabs" (zhengshou tudi, 征收土地) have become the new focal point of rural state-society conflict. 25 Further aggravating rural state-society relations, local officials forcibly requisitioned land from villagers at below-market prices and sold or leased it for huge profits not only for their personal financial gain, but also as an alternative source of public financing (i.e., as an "implicit tax") after they lost their official authority to collect taxes. Already an established slogan in academic circles in the 1990s, the "three rural issues" (san nong wenti, 三农问题, referring to peasants, the countryside, and agriculture) became the policy rubric under which the Hu-Wen administration began to address prevailing sources of state-society tension in 2003.
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In late 2005 it unveiled the "New Socialist Countryside" (jianshe shehuizhuyi xin nongcun, 建设社会主义新农村) or the "New Rural Construction" (xin nongcun jianshe, 新 农村建设) policy program, characterized in the foreign press as China's "New Deal."
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In 2008, in response to the global economic crisis emanating from the United States in 2007, China's central government implemented a four trillian yuan economic stimulus program that extended and accelerated this existing policy momentum. Over 9 per cent of the total stimulus was budgeted for rural infrastructure. At the same time, healthcare and education, earthquake reconstruction, and major transportation, power, and irrigation infrastructural projects, much of which also directly benefits rural areas, accounted for 4, 25, and 38 per cent respectively of the total stimulus package.
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These various policy rubrics gave rise to or further expanded the following specific policies:
  the introduction of a rural consumer subsidy program (jiadian xiaxiang, 家电下乡, "home appliances to the countryside") on an experimental basis in late 2007 and nationwide at the end of 2008 providing instant 13 per cent rebates on home appliances, including refrigerators, televisions, mobile telephones, washing machines, water heaters, air conditioners, and so on; and  direct investment in rural infrastructure, including the expansion and improvement of the power grid, roads, the supply of drinking water, agricultural irrigation, and so on.
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Two unifying properties of the foregoing policies merit emphasis. First, the designed intention of each policy was to boost rural income and narrow the rural-urban income gap as a means of improving state-society relations. For example, abolishing agricultural taxes and raising agricultural subsidies were intended to fatten the pocketbook of every farming family. Likewise, health insurance and the elimination of school tuition for eligible families, by reducing out-of-pocket expenses, were intended to do the same thing. The goal of each rural stimulus policy was to protect villagers' economic well-being, and in so doing to promote domestic consumer demand and preserve social stability. Second, consistent with the "two directions" concept discussed earlier, which calls for reversing the flow of resources between villages and cities, the provision of the above listed public goods is unique in historical perspective for its source of financing. In contrast to earlier periods of time, the financing of public goods under the Hu-Wen administration does not entail direct revenue extraction from their beneficiaries. Rather than bleeding villagers as they did in the past, local governments have financed public goods through fiscal transfers from above and bank loans funneled through hybrid investment companies.
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Compared to previous public goods regimes, the Hu-Wen rural stimulus stands out for allowing villagers to enjoy public goods without paying for their provision in the form of grain, cash, or labor.
In light of the above, one might reasonably expect that the rural stimulus has helped thaw rural state-society relations. Not everyone agrees that the policies are working, however. Recent research paints a portrait of local rural governance "hollowed out" and emasculated by tax reforms.
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Although they are too numerous to review comprehensively here, Martin King Whyte cites several Western media reports of "the spectre of rural unrest," "seeds of fury" and "the pitchfork anger of peasants." 36 But perhaps the most extreme position has been articulated by Yu Jianrong (于建嵘), a prominent and outspoken researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. His assertion that rural China is on "the brink of 'revolutionary turmoil" represents "the first time Yu has directly confronted the Hu-Wen leadership and said their policies have failed and will not work." 37 To be sure, Yu Jianrong is not the only scholar to paint a picture of uninterrupted rural unrest in the wake of the new rural stimulus policies. 38 Such pessimistic assessments of the rural stimulus, however, suffer from two critical limitations. First, they were formulated prior to colossal investment in infrastructure and social welfare mandated by the central government's 2008 economic stimulus plan. Second, they are not based on empirical evidence of ordinary villagers' perceptions of change in governance.
We know that villagers' perceptions of local government lag far behind their perceptions of higher levels of government. Survey research has shown repeatedly that popular trust in the central government is exceedingly high and popular trust in local government exceedingly low. 39 If villagers tend to blame local policy enforcers for harmful central government policies, As we will see below, my research findings are consistent with both patterns. First, they show that the trend of improved perceptions of local governance continued through 2010. Second, they show that the rural stimulus improved perceptions of township and village governments more than it improved perceptions of the central government.
Data and Measures

TWO SURVEYS
Together with sociologists at Renmin University of China, I designed and organized the first large-scale survey on conflict, conflict resolution, and perceptions of local governance and the legal system in rural China. In January and February of 2002, our survey team completed usable interviews of almost 3,000 rural households in one county in each of five provinces (Shaanxi, Henan, Jiangsu, Hunan, and Shandong) and one centrally-administered city (Chongqing). Our original target was five villages per county and 100 interviews per village, or 3,000 households in total. The survey sites were selected not randomly but purposively. The six counties 42 in which the survey was carried out capture enormous socioeconomic and regional diversity. They include relatively prosperous coastal areas. Indeed, one survey site is in the heart of the spectacularly developed Sunan region of southern Jiangsu Province, not far from Shanghai, in which average household income approaches that of Beijing. At the other end of the spectrum are relatively poor, interior areas in Henan and Hunan. Because the six survey sites were selected with the goal of maximizing regional and economic variation, the households interviewed are not intended to be representative of rural China as a whole but only of the six counties from which they were sampled. Although we did not select the survey sites randomly, we trained and instructed survey interviewers to select households randomly within villages and to select respondents randomly within households.
In January and February 2010 we returned to five of the original counties (dropping the Shandong site) to assess change over time. At the time of the original 2002 survey, none of the rural stimulus policies was in place. The two surveys are a source-perhaps the only source-of "before and after data" allowing us to measure the impact of the rural stimulus on the attitudes China's villagers. They are repeated cross-sectional surveys. Because when we designed the original 2002 survey we did not anticipate replicating it in the future, we did not design it as a panel survey. The analyses in this chapter are limited to the 23 villages in 5 counties common to both years (N=2,164 in 2002 and N=2,286 in 2010). Research conditions are largely constant across the two surveys. We returned to many of the same villages, recruited many of the same interviewers to ask many of the same questions to respondents selected in the same manner.
MEASURES
My goal in this chapter is to measure the extent to which state-society relations have changed in the wake of the rural stimulus. Four measures of state-society relations are my dependent variables-my objects of explanation. I test whether public goods provision is a significant predictor of perceptions of the state. Two measures of public goods are my explanatory variables-my explanations for variation in the perceived quality of state-society relations. In other words, I test whether state-society relations can be attributed to public goods provision. I test this relationship using multivariate regression techniques. Since many other factors also influence the quality of state-society relations, I introduce control variables into the analysis. Control variables allow me to test the effect of public goods provision on state-society relations among otherwise seemingly identical households in otherwise seemingly identical contexts. Since public goods provision and perceptions of the state are likely both associated with local economic conditions (i.e., wealthier areas may have more public goods), I control for regional variation. Since they may also be associated with household socioeconomic conditions (i.e., wealthier people may have more upbeat perceptions), I control for economic status and education. 43 I will introduce my dependent variables, explanatory variables, and control variables in turn.
Dependent Variables: Four Measures of State-Society Relations. My first measure of state-society relations is based on questions asked about the degree of care and concern for villagers displayed by various levels of government. Our precise question wording is the following: "Do you think various levels of government are concerned about villagers? If 'wholeheartedly serves villagers' scores 100 points and 'total indifference to villagers' scores 0 points, please provide a score for each level of the following levels of government according to its level of concern." (您认为各级政府是否关心农民？如果以"全心全意为农民服务"为 100 分，以"对农民漠不关心"为 0 分，请您根据各级政府对农民的关心程度给他们打 分). Respondents were asked to provide a score for each of six administrative levels of the state: villagers' committee, township government, county government, municipal government, provincial government, and central government.
My second measure is based on respondents' perceptions of change in villager-cadre relations between 2006 and 2010 gauged by their answers to the following question: "Compared to five years ago, how have relations between villagers and village cadres changed? (1) worsened a lot, (2) worsened some, (3) stayed basically the same, (4) improved some, and (5) improved a lot." ("您觉得，跟五年前相比，现在你们村村民和村干部之间的关系有什么变化？1、变 差了很多，2、变差一些，3、基本没有变化，4、改善了一些，5、改善了很多".)
These two measures were included in the 2010 survey only. However, my third and fourth measures were included on both surveys. My third measure is of respondents' satisfaction with village cadres: "Overall, are you satisfied with the villagers' committee? (1) Very dissatisfied, (2) somewhat dissatisfied, (3) neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, (4) somewhat satisfied, or (5) very satisfied." (总的来说，您对村委会是否满意？1、非常不满意，2、比较 满意，3、一般，4、比较满意，5、非常满意." My fourth and final measure is of respondents' perceptions of villagers' general respect for village cadres: "Overall, people's attitude toward villagers' committee cadres is one of (1) great disrespect, (2) some disrespect (3) neither disrespectful nor respectful, (4) some respect, or (5) great respect." ("根据您的观察，您认为， 总的来说，村民对村干部是否尊敬？1、不尊敬，2、不太尊敬，3、一般，4、比较尊敬， 5、尊敬.)
Explanatory Variables: Two Measures of Public Goods Provision. In order to test the extent to which change in state-society relations can be attributed to change in public goods provision, I employ two measures of public goods provision. My first measure is based on a question about general perceptions of public goods provision: "Following the elimination of 43 Previous survey research in both urban and rural China, however, suggests the relationship between economic well-being and political trust is curvilinear, with low-and high-income respondents reporting the lowest levels of trust. It also suggests the relationship between education and political trust is negative. agricultural taxes, do you believe that government investment in irrigation, schools, medical stations, roads, and other public infrastructure projects has increased or diminished? (1) Diminished a lot, (2) diminished some, (3) stayed basically the same, (4) increased some, or (5) increased a lot." ("您觉得取消农业税之后，政府在水利、学校、医疗站、道路等公共建设 项目上的投入总体上是增加了还是减少了？1、减少了很多，2、减少了一些，3、基本没 有变化，4、增加了一些，5、增加了很多".) Note that the wording of this question does not refer to any specific level of government. Asking generally about "government investment" allows us to assess which level of government gets the most credit from enhanced public goods provision.
My second measure is based on answers to a question about a specific public good, the MLSS: "In 2009 did your family receive MLSS?" ("2009 年您家是否享受过农村低保？") Although in 2010 we also asked respondents whether or not they enjoyed NCMS benefits, received agricultural subsidies, and received a consumer subsidy, I excluded these variables from the analyses because they were unrelated to perceptions of state-society relations. Since they were almost universal and thus exhibited very limited variation in 2010, we should not expect NCMS benefits to help explain state-society relations. I found no obvious reason for the subsidy programs' failure to help explain state-society relations.
Control Variables. Control variables allow us to isolate the relationship between statesociety relations and public good provision, to measure the strength of this relationship net of other potentially confounding factors. I include individual-level, household-level, and contextual control variables. Individual-level control variables include gender, age, and educational attainment. Household-level control variables include socioeconomic status and its change over the previous five years. Rather than measuring socioeconomic status as income, I instead follow Jie Chen by measuring socioeconomic status as subjective relative economic position 44 on the basis of answers to the following question: "Compared to most people in your village, is your family's current economic status better or worse?" (1) much worse, (2) somewhat worse, (3) about the same, (4) somewhat better, or (5) much better. ("您觉得与村里大多数人家相比，当 前您家的经济状况是好还是差？1、差很多，2、差一些，3、差不多，4、好一些，5、好 很多".) My measure of change in socioeconomic status is based on answers to the following question: "Compared to five years ago, have your family's economic conditions improved? (1) worsened a lot, (2) worsened some, (3) stayed basically the same, (4) improved some, or (5) improved a lot." ("跟五年前相比，您家的经济状况是否有所改善？1、差了很多，2、差了 一些，3、基本没有变化，4、有一些改善，5、改善很大".) Insofar as it is reasonable to expect village cadres and their family members to report relatively positive perceptions of statesociety relations, I also include a control variable for the presence of at least one village leader in the household. Dummy variables for the county survey sites constitute my contextual control variables.
Analysis and Findings
As the title of this chapter indicates, this is an impact study. My goal is to assess the impact of the rural stimulus on state-society relations in rural China. In support of this goal, I conduct a three-part analysis. First, I measure villagers' perceptions of the state in 2010, and the extent to which they varied by level of the state-i.e., the extent of a perception gap between the local state and the Center. Second, I measure the extent to which state-society relations changed over time. Third, I measure the extent to which public goods provision explains the quality of rural state-society relations.
STEP 1: STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS IN 2010
Survey respondents' perceptions of the state in 2010 varied greatly according to the level of the state they were asked to assess. As the administrative level of the state in question rose, their perceptions became successively more positive. Thus, no different from earlier research cited earlier this chapter showing that Chinese citizens do not perceive the state as a monolithic entity, our 2010 survey data show that villagers were relatively upbeat about the Center and relatively negative about the local state. With respect to the "degree of care for villagers" displayed by various levels of the state, perceptions of township and village governments were lowest and perceptions of the central government were highest (Figure 1 ). Although we can see from Figure  1 that state-society relations in 2010 were relatively strained at local levels, this analysis alone reveals nothing about change over time-whether local state-society relations were even worse prior to the rural stimulus-or about possible reasons for villagers' perceptions. The next sections shed light on these unanswered questions.
Figure 1. Popular Perceptions of the Degrees of Care for Villagers by Various Levels of Government, Five Counties, Rural China, 2010
NOTE: N=2,281. Values of this measure range from 0 ("total disregard for villagers") to 100 ("wholehearted concern for villagers"). With the exception of "villagers' committee" and "township government," differences between which are not statistically significant at any conventional level, all differences are statistically significant at the p<.01 level. SOURCE: author's survey STEP 2: CHANGE IN STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS OVER TIME Villagers' assessments of change in relations between villagers and local leaders between 2006 and 2010 are overwhelmingly tilted in a positive direction (Figure 2 ). The plurality of respondents (45 per cent) indicated that relations had "improved some," and the majority of respondents (54 per cent) indicated some degree of improvement (either "some" or "a lot of" improvement). Meanwhile, only a miniscule proportion of respondents indicated a deterioration of state-society relations at the village level (with only 0.4 per cent indicating relations had become "a lot" worse, and 2.4 per cent indicating "some" worsening). All in all, survey (Figure 3) . The proportion of respondents reporting they were "satisfied" (either "very" or "somewhat") and the proportion of respondents reporting that villagers were generally "respectful" (either "very" or "somewhat") remained remarkably stable between 2002 and 2010. "Satisfaction" dropped only modestly from 59 to 56 per cent, and perceived "general respect" increased slightly from 57 to 58 percent. In fact, according to  2 tests, neither of these changes is statistically significant at the conventional p≤.05 level. Dramatic change, however, occurs in the neutral and negative response categories. Between 2002 and 2010, roughly 10 per cent of responses shifted out of negative categories and into the neutral category. Over this eight year period, the proportion of respondents reporting they were "dissatisfied" (either "somewhat" or "very") and the proportion of respondents 45 reporting that villagers were generally "disrespectful" (either "somewhat" or "very") dropped from 16 to 10 per cent and from 21 to 8 per cent respectively. At the same time the neutral "so-so" categories swelled commensurately. Such a dramatic decline in negative responses and a corresponding increase in neutral responses must be recognized as progress, as positive change, and as compelling evidence that the rural stimulus policies improved state-society relations. The thawing of state-society relations in the 23 villages portrayed in Figure 4 cannot be attributed to political desirability bias unless we somehow have a reason to believe that this source of bias strengthened between 2002 and 2010. To the extent that political desirability bias remained roughly constant in the time between the surveys, we can be confident that Figure 2 
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Findings reported thus far strongly suggest that villagers have benefitted from the rural stimulus. In the next section I perform a more direct test of the effect of public goods provision.
STEP 3: EXPLAINING STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS AND THEIR EVOLUTION
My final analysis will test the effect of public goods provision on state-society relations. In so doing, it will provide answers to two specific questions. First, has public goods provision promoted local state-society relations? Second, has public goods provision helped the public image of township and village levels of government catch up to that of the central government by narrowing the perception gap between the local-and higher-levels of the state?
Survey respondents were overwhelmingly positive in their assessments of change with respect to public goods provision (Figure 4) . A whopping 84 per cent of respondents reported that government investment in public goods provision had "increased" (either "some" or "a lot"). Meanwhile, only a tiny proportion of respondents reported that public goods provision had "diminished" (with only 0.4 per cent indicating it diminished "a lot" and 1.7 per cent indicating "some" diminishment). The picture that emerges from our surveys of popular perceptions of public goods provision in the wake of agricultural tax relief is sharply at odds with the picture of "hollowed out" rural governance in the existing scholarship. 47 46 Village-level scatterplots are available from the author upon request. 47 Li, "State and Market in Public Service Provision"; Smith, "The Hollow State" "After taxes were abolished, has government investment in public goods changed?"
Villagers reported positive change about more than public goods provision. They were similarly upbeat in their assessments of change in their own household economic conditions ( Figure 5 ). The vast majority (85 per cent) of respondents reported that their family's economic conditions had improved (either "some" or "a lot") since 2006-a central objective of the rural stimulus policies. Since income growth could also explain an improvement in state-society relations, I use multivariate regression analysis to test the effect of public goods provision on state-society relations holding constant potentially confounding factors including household economic conditions. After all, public infrastructure projects should boost household income by, for example, boosting agricultural productivity, improving transportation, and reducing healthcare expenses. A bivariate relationship between improved public goods provision and improved state-society relations could thus conceivably be explained to some degree by improved household economic conditions. In order to test-and rule out-this and similar possibilities, my multivariate regression models include a variety of control variables that could potentially weaken or explain away the effect of public goods provision. Table 1 contains descriptive information about the variables included in my multivariate regression analysis. The complete regression models are presented in Table 2 . In my regression model for improvement in villager-village cadre relations (Table 2 , Model 1), the dependent variable is dichotomous. I transformed the original ordinal variable into a dichotomous variable by letting "improved some" and "improved a lot" equal "1" ("yes, relations improved") and by letting "no change," "worsened some," and "worsened a lot" equal "0" ("no, relations did not improve"). The regression models show that, net of controls, perceived change in government investment in public goods is positively associated (1) with perceived improvements in local state-society relations (Model 1) and (2) with perceptions of the state's degree of care for villagers (Models 2-7). Among otherwise seemingly identical households in otherwise seemingly identical contexts, a one-unit increase in the value of an answer to the question about public goods provision (i.e., the difference between a response of "no change" and "improved some" or between a response of "improved some" and "improved a lot") increased the odds of a perceived improvement in local state-society relations by 34 per cent (Model 1, e .295 =1.343). 48 Likewise, all else being equal, each one-unit increase in perceptions of public goods provision increased the score representing a level of government's degree of care and concern for villagers. Not only did public goods provision boost perceptions of every level of the state, but lower levels of the state (village, township, and county) received the biggest boost and the central government received the smallest boost. Although I do not report them in detail here, confidence intervals (set at 95 per cent) show that the coefficients for public goods in Models 2-6 are not statistically significantly different from one another, but that the coefficient in Model 7 is statistically significantly different from that in Models 2 and 3. In plain English, this means that public goods provision improved perceptions of township and village levels of government significantly more than they improved perceptions of the central government.
Being a member of a household receiving MLSS made less of a difference. Although it more than doubled the odds of a perceived improvement in local state-society relations (Model 1, e .785 =2.192), it had no effect on perceptions of the state's degree of care and concern for villagers (Models 2-7). Noteworthy patterns also emerge from the control variables. Improvements in household economic conditions also promoted state-society relations. Change in household income is a significant predictor of state-society relations at lower levels (Models 1-4) but not at higher levels (Models 5-7). Likewise, subjective relative economic status is statistically significant at the village level (Models 1-2) but not at higher levels (Models 3-7). Just as public goods provision improved local state-society relations more than higher-level state-society relations, economic change also exerted a larger and more positive effect on state-society relations at local levels than at higher levels. Although I had expected that respondents in households containing a village leader would report more positive perceptions of state-society relations, this effect is inconsistent and generally weak.
Figure 6 distills and more intuitively represents the key findings contained in Table 2 . It contains predicted outcomes calculated by plugging different values of the measure of "perceived change in government investment in public goods" into the regression models in Table 2 . Holding all other variables constant at their average values (i.e., those in Table 1 ), Figure 6 displays the effects of changing the value of this variable from "no change" to "increased a lot." We can see that such a change is associated with an increase in the probability of perceiving an improvement in villager-village cadre relations from .480 to .624 (or a change of [.624-.480]/.480=30 per cent). We can also see that such a change is also associated with an increase in the score representing the village government's degree of care and concern for villagers from 60. The outcome values contained in this figure were calculated using the multivariate regression models in Table 2 . With the exception of "perceived change in government investment in public goods," which is set to either "no change" or "increased a lot," all remaining variables are set to sample means reported in Two patterns immediately emerge in high relief from Figure 6 . First, the largest improvements in state-society relations have occurred at local levels. A change in perceived public goods provision from "no change" to "increased a lot" boosts the "degree of government care for villagers" score by over 20 per cent at the village, township, and county levels, but boosts this score by only 4 per cent at the level of the central government. Second, as perceptions of public goods improve, the perception gap between the local state and the Center shrink. Among respondents who indicated "no change" in public goods provision, the gap between village government and the Center is 27.9 points (88.7-60.8=27.9). Meanwhile, among respondents who indicated that public goods provision "increased a lot," the gap was 19.2 points (92.4-73.2=19.2). Thus, a change in perceived public goods provision from "no change" to "increased a lot" shrinks the gap by about 9 points (27.9-19.2=8.7). At the township level and county levels, the gap vis-à-vis the central government shrinks to a similar extent by 10 and 11 points respectively. However, at higher levels of the state the gap vis-à-vis the central government shrinks far less: only 6 and 4 points respectively for municipal and provincial governments.
Discussion and Conclusions
In his book about public goods provision in China, Tony Saich writes, "The perception that people have of service delivery by the state affects the way they assess government performance more broadly." By the time of the second survey in 2010, local governments, to varying degrees, had already implemented the various subsidy, social welfare, and public infrastructure programs that constitute what I collectively term the "rural stimulus." Quasi-experimental conditions such as these afforded a rare opportunity to conduct an impact study. The surveys show that, so far at least, the policies have been generally successful. Information villagers reported in the surveys reflect dramatic improvements in public goods provision, household income, and state-society relations. In the time spanning the two surveys, villagers have received more resources from the state and have paid less for them. The surveys also suggest that public goods are an important reason why state-society relations have improved. Public goods significantly enhanced villagers' perception that the government cares about their wellbeing.
Although every level of government enjoyed a popularity boost from improvements in public goods provision, this effect was uneven across different administrative levels of the state. In 2010 perceptions of the central government remained far more positive than perceptions of township and village government. Despite the persistence of such a prominent perception gap, however, the survey data suggest that the greatest gains have been made at local levels of the state. Public goods boosted perceptions of local government far more than they boosted perceptions of the central government. Local levels of governments have received more credit than higher levels of government for public goods for perhaps two reasons. First, just as villager discontent was directed primarily at the local state prior to the rural stimulus, villager satisfaction has been directed primarily at the local state in the wake of the rural stimulus. Just as villagers blamed local state agents for enforcing and adapting in a predatory manner to unfavorable central government policies, they have likewise credited local state agents for carrying out favorable policies. Second, because popular perceptions of the central government were already so extremely positive, there was little room for improvement. Because popular perceptions of local levels of government, by contrast, were relatively negative, the possibility for improvement here was far greater.
Data from the two surveys reflect a rapprochement in rural state-society relations, a thawing of state-society tensions between 2002 and 2010. Although every major source of statesociety conflict that afflicted rural China at the time of the first survey seems to have been addressed by the rural stimulus, and although on balance the general trajectory of change has been positive, state-society tensions in rural China persist. In open-ended interviews in some of the survey sites, villagers celebrated their newfound freedom from formerly predatory village cadres. In other survey sites, however, villagers complained about a new wave of local cadre power grabs fueled by the rural stimulus. Township and village leaders in some areas have allegedly abused their positions as gatekeepers to new resources flooding into the countryside as a means of benefitting themselves, their relatives, and their friends. Perceptions of misappropriation of resources and other forms of corruption were particularly acute with respect to the MLSS. Village cadres exercise considerable discretion over determining which households receive MLSS payments. Stories abound of village cadres distributing MLSS payments to households to which they were closely connected but which did not meet objective qualification criteria, thus depriving some of the neediest and most deserving households. 50 Villagers accused village cadres of cronyism and corruption (favoritism, bribes, and kickbacks) in the process of awarding construction contracts for infrastructure projects. They accused village cadres of skimming off the top of infrastructure project budgets by cutting corners, by substituting materials, and by scaling back the size of projects (e.g., narrowing roads). They accused village cadres of failing to pay for small construction and repair projects contracted to ordinary villagers. Long after they were outlawed, local levies were still being collected in one of our survey sites. Here the township government levied a road construction fee from every household. Villagers reported that this project was already fully funded thanks to the 2008 economic stimulus plan, and that the levies were therefore lining the pockets of corrupt local state actors. In short, statesociety tensions thawed but far from disappeared.
We can also begin to speculate about the specter of the infamous J-curve-a widening gap between popular expectations and the state's ability to satisfy them. 51 provision could come to a grinding halt in the likely event of widespread defaulting on the loans that have financed the bulk of public infrastructure construction mandated by the stimulus plan. 52 Finally, a new part of the "New Rural Construction" program on the horizon entails housing land consolidation and villager resettlement. If, as observers predict, this policy is met with vehement popular resistance, it could potentially reverse gains made in rural state-society relations. 53 While we have good reason to believe that state-society relations have taken a turn for the better, we also have good reason to harbor questions about the long-term sustainability of this trend.
